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COMMENT
'FOUR LEGS GOOD, TWO LEGS BAD":' THE ISSUE
OF STANDING IN ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,
INC. V. GLICKMAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
"Mr. Wise, there are inmates on Death Row who have not received
as complete a defense as Pup-Pup."2
"Ihough cloaked in the moral armor of self righteousness, animal
rights activists show contempt for the lives of ordinary people. They
are engaged in an elitist war against the common man... If we
don't stand up to them now, there will be no one left to stand up for
us later."3
These comments represent a view of the animal rights
movement that is shared by people "from every continent on
earth."4 In this view, the legal recognition of animal rights is
either, as implied by the first comment, a frivolous and slightly
contemptible waste of legal talent and resources, or, as posited
in the second comment, a cruel rejection of the superior rights
claims of human beings.5 Through its standing requirement
1 GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 40 (1946). The connection between this
phrase and the animal rights movement was made by Kathleen Marquardt in
ANnmALSCAM: THE BEASTLY ABUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (1993). Marquardt uses the
phrase to demonstrate the folly of the characterization of human beings as evil
and animals as innocent. Orwell's book supports her point, as the reader is meant
to marvel at the prejudice of this chant. Yet the point of Orwell's satire is to
ridicule the superior status the human race attaches to itself, a philosophy at odds
with that of Marquardt.
' Alexander Stile, Animal Advocacy, NATL L.J., Apr. 16, 1990, at 1 (quoting a
Massachusetts federal judge who rendered a decision to stay a death sentence
given to a dog branded a public nuisance).
MARQUARDT, supra note 1, at 9.
' MARQUARDT, supra note 1, at xvi.
5 See, e.g., MARQUARDT, supra note 1, at 4. Marquardt states, "Make no mis-
take about it: animal rights means no milk for our children, no insulin for dia-
betics, and no guide dogs for the blind." She continues, 'The real agenda of this
[animal rights] movement is not to give rights to animals, but to take rights from
people . . . ." MARQUARDT, supra note 1, at 6.
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for suits brought under animal protection statutes, the Ameri-
can legal system reinforces this perspective. In order to trigger
statutory protection, plaintiffs suing under federal animal
protection statutes must demonstrate that a human being or
an animal organization, as well as an animal itself, has suf-
fered harm.6 Simply put, if the only injury alleged is the inju-
ry done to an animal, there is no injury that the law will recog-
nize and therefore no claim. Independent jural standing for
animals does not exist in our law; indeed, it has been noted
that "[n]o society... has ever politically empowered living
animals, with the possible exception of Caligula's Rome."7
Nevertheless, while the granting of independent legal stand-
ing to animals may be an unrealistic goal given our present
legal system, it is fair to state that the current climate in the
United States is not as averse to animal protection as the
above comments suggest.'
The recent Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
case of Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman
("ALDF')9 illustrates this favorable climate by broadly inter-
preting the requirements of jural standing under the Animal
Welfare Act ("AWA"),'0 thereby increasing the number of hu-
man plaintiffs able to bring AWA suits for animal mistreat-
' See Tom Regan, Progress Without Pain: The Argument for Humane Treat-
ment of Research Animals, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 513, 517 (1987) ("Time and time
again, without exception, animals are denied the independent jural standing they
deserve and are, instead, systematically treated as if they deserve the law's atten-
tion ... only if some human interest is harmed or benefited.").
' David R. Schmahmann & Lori J. Polacheck, The Case Against Rights for
Animals, 22 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 747, 781 (1995) (referring to the emperor
Caligula's deification of his favorite horse).
' See, for example, Thomas G. Kelch, Toward a Non-Property Status for Ani-
mals, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 531 (1998), in which the author states:
As science has altered what we know to be the facts of the relation of
animals and humans, modern moral and social theory is altering the way
that animals are perceived, and the value attached to them. The inter-
ests of animals are for the first time being legitimized, not only in aca-
demic circles, but in the minds of significant portions of the populace, in
the judicial system and in legislative enactments.
Id. at 580.
' 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998) [hereinafter ALDFJ, cert. denied, National
Ass'n for Biomedical Research v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 1454
(1999).
10 Animal Welfare Act of 1970, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2156 (1994) (amended 1970,
1975, 1980, and 1990).
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ment. Additionally, the decision suggests growing judicial sym-
pathy towards the granting of independent jural standing to
animals. When analyzed along with its previous D.C. Circuit
panel decision ("ALDF It')1" and the decision of the district
court ("ALDF V'),' ALDF reveals that the standing require-
ment for AWA suits has now become significantly easier to
satisfy. According to the opinion, the three factors of a consti-
tutional standing analysis, (1) an injury in fact, (2) caused by
the defendant, (3) that can be judicially redressed, are satis-
fied, in terms of an AWA suit, by a plaintiff who (1) observes
an animal in a habitat unsatisfactory to his educated but per-
sonal concept of a proper animal environment, (2) demon-
strates only negligent government supervision, rather than
affirmative government requirement, of this inadequate envi-
ronment, and (3) provides non-specific evidence that the re-
quested relief will redress his injury.13 This holding substan-
tially modifies the circuit's precedent. 4 It removes the strict
AWA standing interpretation that had become "a near insur-
mountable difficulty for third parties seeking a hearing on the
substantive claims they have brought under the [AWA]."' 5 As
a result, ALDF's broad standing requirement is
groundbreaking, for it portends that many more suits brought
under the AWA will now be addressed on the merits. 6
Part I of this Comment reviews both the factual back-
ground of ALDF and the standing requirements mandated by
the Constitution and the AWA and summarizes the standing
interpretations in ALDF I and ALDF II. Part II analyzes the
ALDF opinion and concludes that it is a valid and necessary
" See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 130 F.3d 464 (D.C. Cir.
1997) [hereinafter ALDF I!].
2 See Animal Legal Defense Fund Inc. v. Glickman, 943 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C.
1996) [hereinafter ALDF I]. Note that this decision, after finding that the plaintiffs
had standing to sue, proceeded to address the case on the merits. That portion of
the decision is outside the scope of this Comment, and is therefore not discussed.
'3 See ALDF, 154 F.3d at 430-45.
," See id. at 449 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (claiming that "the majority radically
departs from our precedent").
15 See Joseph Mendelson, HI, Should Animals Have Standing? A Review of
Standing Under the Animal Welfare Act, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 795, 796
(1997) (explaining that "[iun virtually all AWA claims, legal failures result not
from any deficiency on the merits of the cases brought before the courts, but rath-
er from jurisdictional challenges to third parties").
" See Mendelson, supra note 15, at 815.
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interpretation of the standing requirements. Part IH evaluates
the extent to which animal rights groups and concerned indi-
viduals can use the decision as a means to safeguard animals
from exploitation and abuse and suggests that ALDF supports
even greater animal protection through the granting of inde-
pendent jural standing to animals. Finally, Part IH concludes
that as. independent jural standing for animals is unlikely to
be adopted in light of this country's legal and economic sys-
tems, ALDF serves as an important bulwark in the fight
against animal exploitation.
I. THE HISTORY OF ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, INC. V.
GLICKEMN
A. The Statutory Basis of the ALDF Claims
"Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is
not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."'7
This statement from ALDF I provides an insight into the
origin of Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman. The
AWA is the primary federal statute regulating animal use and
governs federal animal research facilities as well as various
other activities in which animal treatment is a factor.18 The
AWA also regulates individuals who have extensive contact
with animals, such as pet dealers, animal exhibitors, and fed-
eral medical research grant recipients." According to Con-
gress, the AWA demonstrates "a continuing commitment... to
the ethic of kindness to dumb animals."" However, the AWA,
in and of itself, has no power to protect animals. Rather, the
AWA requires the Department of Agriculture to "promulgate
standards to govern the humane handling, care, treatment,
and transportation of animals by dealers, research facilities,
and exhibitors."2' These standards must include "minimum
requirements ... for a physical environment adequate to pro-
17 ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. at 51 (quoting A. DE TOCQUEVU.LE, DEMOcRAcY IN
AMERICA 98, 280 (P. Bradley Knoff ed., 1948)).
"1 See Mendelson, supra note 15, at 795.
19 See id.
20 H.R. REP No. 1651, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5103, 5104.
21 AWA, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(1) (1994) (amended 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1990).
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mote the psychological well-being of primates."22 Unfortunate-
ly, the AWA is no more specific than this; it gives no guidelines
as to what these "minimum requirements" for primates should
be. Noting this, the author of the ALDF I opinion, Judge
Richey, commented, "[Tloo often, Congress enacts generalized
legislation and, thus, passes to an executive agency the respon-
sibility to interpret and fill in gaps that Congress itself could
not or would not specifically legislate."' Essentially, Congress
was to blame for this suit. Its vague drafting of the AWA led to
the confusion over what constituted appropriate animal hous-
ing standards, the crux of the plaintiffs' claims.'
B. The ALDF I Decision
The circumstances behind ALDF are straightforward. The
plaintiffs are four animal enthusiasts who were frequent visi-
tors to local game farms and zoosY During those visits, each
individual personally observed primates kept in inhumane
conditions like solitary, barren and dirty cages, which condi-
tions they knew were likely to agitate and unsettle these socia-
ble, sensitive animals.26 As a result of these practices, and
their powerlessness to remedy them, the plaintiffs contended
that they suffered emotional anguish and psychological harm
and asserted that, if the conditions persisted, they would be
forced to discontinue their habit of visiting these facilities.'
Therefore, each of the plaintiffs sought to compel the Secretary
of Agriculture and his officials," to whom Congress had dele-
22 Id. § 2143(a)(2)(B).
' ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. 44, 51 (D.D.C. 1996).
24 See id. Judge Richey explained that it is because of such generalized leg-
islation that the "courts remain to provide the last medium of hope for all Ameri-
cans," and indicated that Congressional regulatory delegations such as these are
"one of the basic reasons why the American people have lost faith in much of
their government." Id. at 50. He also stated, "[were either or both the Legislative
and Executive Branches more successful in the lawful exercise of their responsibili-
ties under Articles I and II of the Constitution, it would not be necessary for the
Courts to intervene." Id. at 51.
"These four individual plaintiffs are Roseann Cirelli, Mary Eagan, Marc
Jurnove, and Audrey Rahn. See id. at 51.
26 See ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. at 54-55.
See id.
2Specifically, those individuals are Dr. Lonnie King, Administrator of the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, and the United States Department of
1999]
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gated the authority of enforcing the AWA, to revamp their cur-
rent regulations so as to ensure that game farms placed pri-
mates in a physical environment "adequate to promote the[ir]
psychological well-being" and "social grouping."29 The plain-
tiffs contended that the promulgation of new, effective regula-
tions would promote the well-being of the primates, and, as a
result, assuage the injuries they sustained personally.
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. ("Fund") became a
plaintiff as part of its strategy to make the AWA an effective
regulatory tool in the fight against animal mistreatment.30
Specifically, Fund claimed that the Secretary of Agriculture
denied it access to game farm plans for primate psychological
well-being, thereby prohibiting it from monitoring and evaluat-
ing the efficacy of the government regulations.3' In the 1993
case of Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Secretary of Agricul-
ture, 2 Fund, along with another set of individual plaintiffs,
mounted a similar challenge to the Secretary of Agriculture's
regulations pursuant to the AWA, but its victory was vacated
by the D.C. Circuit3 on the grounds that both the individuals
and Fund lacked standing.34 Thus, Fund's purpose in institut-
ing this current suit was twofold: it wished to protect primates
from further abuse and it wanted to force the D.C. Circuit to
re-consider its earlier decision.
In response to the plaintiffs' request that the court declare
unlawful and set aside the Secretary of Agriculture's regula-
tions, the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment
Agriculture generally.
29 ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. at 51 (stating the five counts the plaintiffs alleged).
The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture are codified at 9
C.F.R. §§ 3.75-3.81 (1996). They require the game farm to "develop, document and
follow an appropriate plan for environment enhancement adequate to promote the
psychological well-being of non-human primates." Id. § 3.81. Additionally, the plan
"must be in accordance with the currently accepted professional standards as cited
in the appropriate professional journals or reference guides, and as directed by the
attending veterinarian." Id.
"0 See ALDF II, 130 F.3d 464, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that the suit is
part of FUND's "campaign to influence USDA's administration of the Animal Wel-
fare Act").
'l See ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. at 53.
32 813 F. Supp. 882 (D.D.C. 1993), vacated by Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
"See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
s See id. at 722.
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based upon plaintiffs' lack of standing. 5 Although this argu-
ment had successfully vacated Fund's earlier victory in Animal
Legal Defense Fund v. .Secretary of Agriculture, the district
court refused to change its position. Judge Richey wrote, "This
case involves animals, a subject that should be of great impor-
tance to all humankind. It also involves the failures of our
system of government... "36 The need for animal protection,
coupled with the need to make the AWA achieve its intended
purpose, made mere parroting of the previous circuit court
holding unacceptable. According to the ALDF I court, the re-
analysis of the plaintiffs' standing argument was a necessary
and just exercise."
The ALDF I court based its decision upon the standing
requirements enumerated by Justice Scalia in the Supreme
Court's recent decision, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.8 De-
veloped from the Constitution's Article In requirement that
federal jurisdiction be extended only to those suits that exhibit
a "case or controversy" between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant, the standing doctrine demands that to merit judicial at-
tention, a plaintiff must satisfy three requirements. 9 First,
the plaintiff must show that he suffered an injury-in-fact, i.e.,
the invasion of a legally protected interest that is not only
concrete and particularized, but also actual or imminent.4"
Second, the plaintiff must establish that there is a causal con-
nection between the injury and the conduct giving rise to the
complaint such that the injury can be reasonably traced back
to the challenged action of the defendant.4 Third, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that it is likely, and not merely speculative,
that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.4"
Under the AWA, plaintiffs must meet an additional require-
' See ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. at 51. The plaintiffs and the defendants also filed
cross-motions for summary judgment on the merits. See id.
, Id. at 50.
See id. Judge Richey called the defendants' rule-making lapses "egregious"
and "one of the basic reasons why the American people have lost faith in much of
their government." See id.
38 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
31 See Mendelson, supra note 15, at 801-02 (citing Family & Children's Center,
Inc. v. School City of Mishawaka, 13 F.3d 1052, 1058 (7th Cir. 1994)).
o See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 561.
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ment, a prudential consideration that requires a plaintiff who
has satisfied Article III standing requirements to demonstrate
that his injuries fall within the "zone of interests" protected by
the AWA.43
The ALDF I court held that both Fund and the individual
plaintiffs had standing to sue." The logic and simplicity of its
standing analysis contrasted with the troubled history of AWA
suits. Addressing Fund first, the court ruled that Fund had
standing under Article III because it had suffered what is
termed an "informational" injury, stating "[tihere is no ques-
tion that an organization may have standing in its own right
to seek judicial relief and to vindicate the rights and immuni-
ties itself may enjoy. " The standing requirement for judicial
recognition of an informational injury merely requires proof of
a "'concrete and demonstrable injury" to its activities caused
by the government.46 Here, the government's failure to imple-
ment regulations requiring game farms to issue periodic re-
ports meant that Fund was unable to engage in one of its main
purposes, the dissemination of information about AWA compli-
ance in game farms.47 Analysis of the three prongs was un-
necessary-the District Court for the District of Columbia had
previously held such injury constitutionally sufficient for
standing, and this court would hold the same.48
The bigger problem for the court was the prudential zone
of interests test. The court explained that previous Fund suits
directed at AWA implementation failures had not qualified for
a zone of interests analysis because those suits were directed
at abusive animal research facilities rather than at animal
exhibitors.49 According to the AWA, research facility monitor-
ing is the province of designated oversight committees."
Thus, animals living in research facilities already have their
' The zone of interests test applies to all suits filed under federal statutes and
is codified in the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988).
"See ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. 44, 51-52 (D.D.C. 1996). The court did not grant
standing to Rahn, nor to Fund as the representative of its members, for reasons
irrelevant here. See id. at 52-55.
4 Id. at 53 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975)).
" Id. (quoting Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982)).
4 See id.
See ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. at 53.
" See id.
so See AWA § 2143(b)(1) (1994) (amended 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1990).
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interests protected, obviating the need for Fund monitoring
and resulting in Fund exclusion from the collection of interests
the AWA was created to protect.5' The court explained thatanimal exhibition facilities, on the other hand, were not the
province of established oversight committees and therefore
there was no general impediment to Fund's assertion that its
injury fell within the AWA's zone of interests.52 However, in
terms of whether Fund's injuries in this particular case were
within the AWA's zone of interests, Fund had to show that
there was either "a congressional intent to benefit [it] or some
indication that [it] is a 'peculiarly suitable challenger of admin-
istrative neglect." Although the court admitted that it was
"less than clear" that Fund was an intended beneficiary of the
AWA,' it did deem Fund to be a suitable challenger to the
defendants' administrative neglect because of its high stake in
the suit's outcome.55 As the court explained, the defendants'
failure to comply with the AWA mandate directly affected
Fund's efforts and resources by preventing it from expending
its resources on the investigation of and education about non-
human primate well-being.56 Thus, the court determined that
Fund's claims did indeed fall within the zone of interests pro-
tected by the AWA, and, consequently, that Fund did have
standing to sue.57
The court next applied each prong of the standing require-
ment to the individual plaintiffs. With respect to the plaintiffs'
injuries-in-fact, the court recounted the specific injuries al-
leged, namely, the aesthetic and emotional harm they suffered
as a result of the continued inhumane primate housing at the
local game farms.58 Explaining that because the injuries were
" See ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. at 53.
52 See id. at 54.
' Id. (quoting Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 503
(D.C. Cir.1994)).
", Id. The Court explained that the AWA's purpose, in the area of primate
exhibition facilities, is to create and enforce standards that ensure that the pri-
mates are kept humanely. See id. As one of Fund's goals is to improve the living
conditions for primates kept for public display and to counsel and inform the pub-
lic about AWA compliance in this regard, the court held that it was "reasonable to
assume" that an organization such as Fund was intended to benefit from the




" See id. at 54-55; see also Mendelson, supra note 15, at 815 (providing a
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concrete, "the desire to... observe an animal species, even for
purely aesthetic purposes, is undeniably a cognizable interest
for purpose of standing,"'59 and particular, "'the injury... af-
fect[s] the plaintiff[s] in a personal and individual way," the
court concluded that the individual plaintiffs had indeed suf-
fered an injury-in-fact. Noting that it is settled that in order
for an injury to meet the injury-in-fact test it must be distinct
from one that could be suffered by the general public,6 the
court acknowledged that, had the plaintiffs alleged that their
injuries stemmed from a generalized interest in the topic of
animal welfare rather than from a personal experience of ani-
mal harm, the injury-in-fact requirement would not be satis-
fied. 2 However, in this case, because the plaintiffs alleged
specific repercussions and because they could demonstrate that
they suffered in a concrete and individualized way, the court
ruled that they had more than adequately satisfied the injury-
in-fact standard."
Addressing causation, the court first reiterated the
government's mandate under the AWA to promulgate stan-
dards to govern the humane handling of animals by exhibi-
tors." It pointed out that there was little doubt that game
farms would act as the Secretary of Agriculture and his dele-
gates directed them to, if for no other reason than fear that
failure to comply would endanger their animal exhibition li-
censes.65 Accordingly, the conditions witnessed by the plain-
tiffs in this case were fairly traceable to the government's
failure to issue regulations that would satisfactorily govern the
zoos' treatment of its primates.6 Adequate regulations would
have required more humane housing conditions, which in turn
would have prevented the plaintiffs' injuries.
In terms of redressability, the court held that since the
plaintiffs' injuries were caused by the defendants' inadequate
concise summary of the various plaintiffs' claims in the ALDF I case).
'9 ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. at 55 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992)).
' Id. at 56 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1).
61 See id. at 55.
62 See id. at 55-56.
See id.; see also Mendelson, supra note 15, at 816.
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implementation of the AWA, it automatically followed that an
appropriate implementation of the AWA mandate would re-
dress the plaintiffs' injuries." To hold that effective AWA im-
plementation would not create humane animal habitats would
be to render the statute meaningless because the statute nec-
essarily requires facilities to ensure proper care for captive
animals.68 As for the zone of interests consideration, the court
was particularly succinct. It noted that the Congressional
statement as to the policy interests of the AWA provided that
the statute was intended to ensure humane treatment for
exhibition animals.69 It was established that the plaintiffs had
aesthetic interests in observing exhibition animals in humane
conditions.70 Therefore, the plaintiffs had a personal stake in
the outcome of a suit regarding the treatment of exhibition
animals and fell within the zone of interests protected by
the AWA.71
Admittedly, the ALDF I court interpreted the individual
plaintiffs' standing claims broadly, just as it had with the zone
of interests analysis for Fund. The court held Fund to be an
acceptable plaintiff according to the AWA's zone of interests
simply because the government's inadequate regulations ham-
pered its general institutional interest in the dissemination of
information. With regard to the individual plaintiffs, the
court's recognition of personal psychological trauma as a cogni-
zable injury, its expansion of causation to include the failure to
regulate, and its acceptance of non-specific assertions that the
requested relief would redress the injury were all interpreta-
tions rejected by previous opinions as impermissibly expan-
sive.72 In light of these controversial holdings, it was unre-
, See id.
6, See id.
" See ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. at 57 (citing AWA, 7 U.S.C. § 2131(a)(1) (1994)
(amended 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1990)).
70 See id.
71 See id. at 56-57.
72 For injury-in-fact, see, for example, Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 485 (1982)
("T]he psychological consequence presumably produced by observation of conduct
with which one disagrees . . .is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under
Art. II'). For causation, see, for example, Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. Federal
Election Commission, 13 F.3d 412, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that a plaintiff
must "adduce facts showing that the unfettered choices made by independent ac-
tors have been.., made in such manner as to produce causation"). For
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markable that upon appeal a panel of the D.C. Circuit vacated
the lower court's decision. Most striking about the panel deci-
sion was the strong dissent penned by Judge Wald, in which
she averred that the majority had abandoned reason in its
narrow interpretation of the AWA standing requirements."
Her comments herald the demise of the restrictive standing
analysis with regard to AWA suits.
C. The Circuit Court Panel Decision
"It is part of the price of living in society, perhaps especially a free
society, that an individual will observe conduct that he or she dis-
likes."7'
This statement by the majority reveals the underlying
philosophy of their decision, namely, that the AWA was not
designed to remedy all injuries that human beings sustain
through animal mistreatment, but only those sustained by
individuals who meet the demanding threshold standing re-
quirements for AWA suits. 5 As a result, the opinion is in-
fused with an acerbic flavor, the panel keenly aware that it
had established this ground rule in Fund's 1991 suit. Tellingly,
the panel remarked, "[t]his appeal is but the latest chapter in
the ongoing saga of Animal Legal Defense Fund Inc.'s ...
effort to enlist the courts in its campaign to influence USDA's
administration of the Animal Welfare Act. "7 ' Right from the
beginning of the opinion, the panel demonstrated little toler-
ance for the plaintiffs' arguments to expand standing.
Addressing the standing of the individual plaintiffs, the
panel described the conditions under which the primates lived,
noting that "Circelli saw an orangutan who could neither see
nor hear other primates, and who sat quietly by himself in a
redressibility, see, for example, Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658,
663-64 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that plaintiffs must show that it is "likely" that
the relief they seek will alleviate their injuries).
73 See ALDF II, 130 F.3d 464, 471 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Wald, J., dissenting) ("In
my view, Mr. Jurnove's affidavit amply illustrates how far the majority opinion
has strayed from a reasonable interpretation of the standing requirements under
Supreme Court and our circuit's law.").
74 Id. at 468.
"' See id. at 467. The court devoted an entire section of its opinion to an ex-
planation of the jurisdictional restrictions placed upon prospective federal plaintiffs.
See id. at 467-68.
76 Id. at 466.
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comer .... Jurnove saw a large male chimpanzee... whose
hands and feet were covered with scars and cuts ... Eagan
ha[d] seen primates housed in isolation... including one baby
baboon."77 The panel admitted that "luinder some circum-
stances, interference with the observation and study of animals
may constitute an injury in fact for standing purposes."78
However, this was but a fleeting nod to the plaintiffs, for the
court then firmly elucidated its position with regard to the first
standing requirement, injury-in-fact.
The panel reiterated the familiar definition for injury-in-
fact, namely, that the injury must be cognizable and specific.79
"General emotional harm," the court stated, "no matter how
deeply felt, cannot suffice for injury-in-fact for standing pur-
poses."' In a footnote, the court acknowledged that several
Supreme Court cases had recognized general emotional harm
as an injury-in-fact, but noted that they did so only when the
challenged conduct threatened to reduce the number of ani-
mals available for observation.8'
As the claims here did not allege that the game farms'
treatment of their primates would lead to the diminution of the
primate population, the harm the plaintiffs' alleged was not
sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement. The court
viewed the plaintiffs' injuries merely as non-specific psychologi-
cal harms and ruled that they were, therefore, insufficient to
confer standing.82
In evaluating causation, the court focused on the fact that
the plaintiffs' injuries did not stem from any actual acts di-
rectly performed by the government.0 The court stated that,
where as here, the injuries resulted from the government's
unlawful regulation of a third party, the causation element of
the standing analysis requires a "more exacting scrutiny"
because the alleged government injury is indirect.' In this
7 ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 468.




a' See id. at 468 n.3.
52 See ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 468.
83 See id. at 469.
" Id. at 468 (quoting Freedom Republicans, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n,
13 F.3d 412, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
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case, the government could not be accused of issuing affirma-
tively harmful regulations. In fact, the government had not
issued any regulations at all with respect to primate housing;
all parties agreed that the housing was arranged and super-
vised entirely by the game farms' own experts.' The court
averred that it knew of no cases in which the government was
held to have caused an injury simply by failing to issue regula-
tions which would have prevented injurious conduct.' Indeed,
such a conclusion was, in the court's opinion, fundamentally
illogical-the government does not "cause" an injury simply be-
cause it permits a third party to fashion particular regula-
tions.87 Therefore, absent actual compulsion on the part of the
Secretary of Agriculture that forced the game farms to create
harmful housing conditions, the connection between the
defendants' failure to issue regulations and the plaintiffs' al-
leged injuries was too attenuated to establish causation.'
With regard to the redressability standard, the court held
that since the plaintiffs could not prove that the government's
lack of regulations had caused their injuries, it logically fol-
lowed that requiring the government to issue different regula-
tions was unlikely to be an effective remedy.89 Furthermore,
the court noted that even if it did recognize plaintiffs' claims as
government-caused, and therefore redressable, it would be too
difficult to determine appropriate relief, as the plaintiffs' inju-
ries consisted mainly of emotional scars.' It was less than
clear that such indefinite harms would be remedied because of
the promulgation of different regulations.9 Finally, the court
explained that, in response to new regulations, the exhibitors
might well cease to keep primates rather than comply,92 a
decision that would eliminate the possibility of plaintiff's relief
because the game farms would contain no primates upon which
to bestow this more humane housing. Thus, the court con-
cluded that it was far from certain that ordering the govern-
as See id. at 469.
86 Id.
' ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 469.
See id.
99 See id.
go See id. at 470.
91 See id.
' See ALDF H, 130 F.3d at 470.
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ment to perform the actions the plaintiffs demanded, namely
the promulgation of new regulations, would redress the
plaintiffs' injuries. 3
Passing over the prudential zone-of-interests inquiry en-
tirely, the court quickly dismissed Fund's standing claim. Re-
jecting the ALDF I court's characterization of Fund's injury as
informational and therefore adequate for Article III require-
ments,94 the court characterized Fund's complaint as purely
procedural.95 It held that the crux of Fund's injury was its
inability to participate in the drafting of the government's
allegedly inadequate and illegal game farm regulations. In
particular, Fund wanted to provide input on the regulations
that governed the availability of those primate keepers' reports
that detailed the plans for the psychological enrichment of
primates.96 The government's failure to allow them to do so
meant that Fund could not take advantage of the notice and
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.97
Thus, Fund's injury was procedural only and was not
based on an informational dearth that impeded its "watch-
dog" activities.9 8
The court explained that standing to sue for a procedural
injury depends upon whether the plaintiff can show that the
procedure in question was "'designed to protect some
threatened concrete interest' of the plaintiff."99 Thus, in order
to succeed on this claim, Fund had to show that its exclusion
from participation in the notice and comment procedure
harmed it in a specific and individualized way.'00 The court
concluded that Fund could not make such a showing, as its
predicament was "shared by many others, indeed by the world
at large."' Fund had failed to show that it had suffered a
concrete injury distinct from the abstract, and universally
shared, procedural right to submit comments to the Depart-
See id.
, See ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. 44, 53 (D.D.C. 1996).
" See ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 470.
96 See id at 470-71.
See id. at 470 (citing Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988)).
5 See id.
Id. (citations omitted).




ment of Agriculture. Thus, Fund did not establish that its
procedural injury satisfied Article III standing.
With due respect to the panel opinion, there are several
major flaws in its analysis, which may stem from its
overarching concern about the preservation of Article Ill stand-
ing requirements as a shield against inappropriate federal
claims. In terms of its injury-in-fact holding, the court mis-
characterized the individual plaintiffs' injuries as general,
rather than specific, instances of emotional harm. The
plaintiffs' injuries of "personal distress, anguish and sad-
ness,"1°2 are as personal as emotional injuries, by their na-
ture, can be. As the court did not provide an example of what
it considered was an adequately specific and personal harm,
one is left to speculate as to what types of injury prospective
AWA plaintiffs must suffer in order to possess standing. Is the
only appropriate AWA plaintiff one who has suffered a diag-
nosed and meticulously documented bout of clinical depression?
Such a requirement would certainly weed out many prospec-
tive plaintiffs, but, in light of the broad protective purposes
contemplated by the drafters of the AWA, it does not seem to
be a fair interpretation of the injury-in-fact requirement.
Additionally, the court did not provide an adequate basis
for its causation analysis. Its analysis failed to address the
argument that a regulation that permits parties to engage in
injurious behavior, but does not require them to do so, may
very likely "cause" an injury. It is reasonable to assert that a
failure to regulate does have a coercive effect upon a game
farm (and, therefore, makes the plaintiffs' injuries traceable to
the government's act) because it forces the farms to implement
their own animal treatment guidelines, which may result in
inadequate animal habitats. Indeed, the government's failure
to regulate is tantamount to affirmatively requiring the zoos to
engage in injurious behavior, because without such regulations
most game farms simply will not treat animals in a humane
manner. If they did, there would have been no need for an
animal welfare statute in the first place.
Even the court's exhaustively precise redressability analy-
sis is unconvincing. One of the court's main concerns was that
12 ALDF 1, 943 F. Supp. 44, 54 (D.D.C. 1996).
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the non-specific injury alleged by the plaintiffs left the court
without guidance as to the type of regulation that would re-
dress their injuries. Essentially, the court would have to specu-
late as to what new guidelines the defendants should adopt.
The court viewed such a requirement as a weakening of the
purposefully stringent redressability standard, which demands
that the plaintiff demonstrate that it is likely, and not merely
speculative, that his injuries will be redressed by the requested
relief."3 This standard certainly does give courts a clear
guideline as to what relief measures they should order. Howev-
er, in its concern with the inviolability of the redressability
standard, the majority failed to appreciate the fact that the
plaintiffs in this case, and in similar suits, do not bring AWA
lawsuits simply because they wish to facilitate the tailoring of
game farm conditions to their specific tastes. Rather, their
interest is in the enforcement of an already established stan-
dard, namely, that the Secretary of Agriculture promulgate "a
physical environment adequate to promote the psychological
well-being of primates." 4 Thus, the plaintiffs were not forc-
ing the court to engage in a guessing game as to what type of
regulation would redress their peculiar injuries. Rather, they
were requesting judicial assistance in their effort to compel the
Department of Agriculture to comply with established AWA
principles. The court clung to a strict interpretation of
redressability at the expense of common sense. While finding
satisfaction of the redressability standard in this case does
involve a broader interpretation of the doctrine than previous
cases permitted, it does not follow that the standard is thereby
threatened with extinction.
The strongly worded dissent by Judge Wald focused on
some of these weaknesses. Concentrating solely on the stand-
ing of plaintiff Jurnove, °5 the dissent attacked the weakness
of the panel's injury-in-fact argument, proffering a lengthy
argument as to why Jurnove's injuries were personal and emo-
tional, rather than general.0 ° The dissent explained that
10 See ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 469.
10 AWA, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2)(B) (1994) (amended 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1990).
'0' See ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 471-76 (Wald, J. dissenting). The dissent stated
that as it found Jurnove's claim "more than sufficient" for standing, it would not
address the other plaintiffs' standing claims. Id. at 471 (wald, J., dissenting).
'' See id. at 471-73 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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Jurnove, who had visited his local game farm at least nine
times, was "[b]y virtue of [his] training in wildlife rehabilita-
ion and [his] experience in investigating complaints about the
treatment of wildlife very familiar with the needs of and prop-
er treatment of wildlife."'0 7 It noted that on Jurnove's very
first visit, he was confronted with the sight of a monkey in an
unheated cage "shivering" and "huddled up with her head
tucked in and her arms hugging herself."' It pointed out
that Jurnove saw similarly troubling conditions on his other
visits, prompting such concern about the animals' plight that
he even chose to photograph the animals and send the pictures
to the Department of Agriculture." 9 The dissent further ex-
plained that although inspectors were dispatched to the zoo on
several occasions, no fault was found with the many conditions
that disturbed Jurnove." After marshalling these facts, the
dissent argued that such factors clearly constituted a concrete,
specific emotional injury to Jurnove, as they were conditions
which "directly impair[ed] his well-established and lifelong
aesthetic interest in observing, studying and enjoying animals
by preventing him from seeing these animals in a humane
environment.""' Consequently, the majority should have
deemed the injury-in-fact standard satisfied.
The dissent further bolstered Jurnove's injury-in-fact claim
by noting that the D.C. Circuit had consistently recognized
that people have a significant interest in ensuring that ani-
mals live in humane habitats, an interest which has been held
to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement." In a footnote, it
addressed the majority's argument that the zoos' alleged in-
fractions did not satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement because
107 Id. at 472 (Wald, J., dissenting) (first and second alteration in original).
108 Id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
" See ALDF I, 130 F.3d at 472 (Wald, J., dissenting).
o See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
. Id. at 473 (Wald, J., dissenting).
... See id. (citing Animal Welfare Inst. v. Kreps, 561 F.2d 1002, 1007 (D.C. Cir.
1977) (holding that an aesthetic interest in seeing seals in humane environment is
sufficient for standing); Humane Soc'y v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 45, 52 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(holding that an aesthetic interest in preventing hunting on wildlife refuge is suffi-
cient for standing)).
[Vol. 65: 3
ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, INC. V. GLICKMAN
they did not result in the diminution of a species.' The dis-
sent wondered why the majority found this distinction to be so
compelling. In eloquent dicta, Judge Wald stated:
I cannot believe that constitutional standing actually turns on the
difference between an observer's aesthetic injury from government
action that threatens to wipe out an animal species altogether and
government action that leaves some of the animals in a persistent
state of suffering, which in all probability eventually will insure
their demise. Indeed, the latter seems capable of causing more seri-
ous aesthetic injury in many instances."4
It was the quality of animal life that mattered for an injury-in-
fact, not the quantity.
The dissent challenged the majority's causation analysis
by pointing out that the Supreme Court has held that plain-
tiffs who allege aesthetic injury prove causation if they can
show that the government failed to adequately regulate a third
party."' Turning to the even more recent case of Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, the dissent explained that in cases of al-
leged regulatory failure, the Supreme Court stated that all a
plaintiff need do is "'adduce facts showing that those choices
[of the third party] have been or will be made in such manner
as to produce causation and permit redressability of inju-
ry.,)"" 6 Here, the government was lax on two regulatory
fronts. First, the inhumane conditions at the game farm con-
tinued precisely because the government's inspectors repeated-
ly found the farm's conditions to be in compliance with their
standards."7 If the inspectors had found the zoo to be in non-
compliance, the inhumane conditions would have been
fixed."' Second, the government had failed to promulgate
adequate rules in the first place, thus leaving the game farm
to create its own guidelines."' Had the government estab-
lished adequate regulations, the game farm would have either
conformed itself to such regulations or gone out of business
113 See id. at 473 n.1 (Wald, J., dissenting).
ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 473 n.1 (Wald, J., dissenting).
,, See id. at 474 (Wald, J., dissenting) (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American
Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986)).
11. Id. (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 562 (1992) (alteration in original)).
n1 See id.
1s See id.
"9 See ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 474 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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entirely.2 ' In either instance, the government's failure to
properly regulate the game farm forced the farm to make the
very choices that injured Jurnove.
The dissent further noted that to require Jurnove to show
that the defendants affirmatively promulgated a regulation
which caused injury, rather than simply requiring him to show
that they failed to promulgate one, would place him "in a
catch-22."'2 ' In order to make such a showing, Jurnove would
need access to the game farm's plans in the first place to see
whether they contained any guidelines that were mandated by
the defendants. 2 2 However, even the majority acknowledged
that the defendants did not require the game farms to make
their plans available. 23 Thus, Jurnove had no way to discov-
er whether the defendants affirmatively required the farms to
engage in inhumane conduct.' Consequently, under the reg-
ulatory regime the defendants themselves created, the only re-
course Jurnove had was to allege that the defendants had
failed to issue adequate regulations.'
Briefly addressing the redressability standard, the dissent
contended that the majority's assertion that the plaintiffs'
injuries could not be remedied was based upon a faulty under-
standing of Jurnove's claims. 6 The dissent argued that be-
cause Jurnove stated that he had a habit of visiting the game
farm and intended to visit it again, the defendants' issuance of
tighter regulations would necessarily improve his aesthetic
experience during his future trips.' Either the game farm
would comply with the required standards or close down, ei-
ther of which would result in the protection of the primates
and thereby redress Jurnove's injury.12 Finally, unlike the
majority, the dissent addressed the zone of interests test, not-
ing that the D.C. Circuit had not made it especially demand-
120 See id. (finding irrelevant the majority's contention that causation could not
be shown because a zoo might close rather than comply, and stating that courts
presume that agencies abide by judicial mandates).
121 Id.
12 See id.
123 See id. at 470.
124 See ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 474 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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ing. 9 The dissent explained that a finding of explicit intent to
benefit a particular plaintiff was unnecessary when, as here,
the plaintiff's interests in the regulation were sufficiently
strong so as to make it reasonable to assume that Congress,
if aware of the plaintiff, would have considered him an
acceptable plaintiff.3 '
After determining that Jurnove had satisfied both the
Article III and zone of interests requirements, the dissent
concluded with an important paragraph of dicta about the
standing of inanimate beings.'3 ' Although Judge Wald did
not explicitly support the granting of independent jural stand-
ing to animals, her comments suggested that she believed it
was not an unreasonable development. Specifically, Judge
Wald cited Justice Douglas' famous dissent in Sierra Club v.
Morton,"' in which he proposed that, with regard to environ-
mental issues, the question of standing would be much simpli-
fied if a federal rule were developed which "'allowed environ-
mental issues to be litigated before federal agencies or federal
courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be de-
spoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers.'" '3
In Sierra Club, Justice Douglas argued for the recognition
of independent standing for the environment, pointing out that
"[i]nanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship
has a legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime
purposes... [tihe ordinary corporation is a 'person' for purpos-
es of the adjudicatory process.""4 He concluded, "[t]he voice
of the inanimate object, therefore, should not be stilled."3 5
Relating Sierra Club to the issue of animal abuse, Judge Wald
opined that "in a world in which animals cannot sue on their
own behalf," the majority's standing interpretation made it
unacceptably difficult for plaintiffs to bring suit under the
AWA.'36 The Judge contended that "such a result offends the
'" See ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 475 (Wald, J., dissenting).
13 See id. (Wald, J., dissenting).
131 See id. at 476 (Wald, J., dissenting).
13 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
13 ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 476 (Wald, J., dissenting) (quoting Sierra Club, 405
U.S. at 741 (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
:s Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 742 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 749 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
13, ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 476 (Wald, J., dissenting).
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compassionate purposes of the [AWA]. "  Although not a
ringing endorsement of animal standing, these concluding
statements, highlighted by the reference to the Sierra Club
case, reveal that Judge Wald's dissent was based on more than
her particular method of statutory interpretation. 8 Rather,
her guiding concern was effective animal protection. Thus, both
the ALDF I court's opinion and the ALDF H court's panel dis-
sent foreshadowed a new method of standing analysis for AWA
suits. While this method addresses the threshold requirements
mandated by the Constitution and the AWA, it considers the
furtherance of the AWA's goal of animal welfare to be a coun-
tervailing, and potentially more important, consideration. This
new position was confirmed when the court granted a rehear-
ing of the case en banc and then reversed its panel decision,
holding that Jurnove unequivocally had standing to sue.'39
II. THE ALDF DECISION
A. The Decision Explained
"For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one
thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they
all have one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence over a
beast .... ."140
Although not to the same degree as the above biblical
pronouncement, the ALDF en banc decision demonstrates an
unprecedented concern for animals, at least at the D.C. Circuit
level, that portends meaningful legislative protection of their
health and welfare. Judge Wald, the panel dissenter, who
staunchly supported an expansive interpretation of AWA
standing in order to protect animals, authored the opinion. In
accord with that dissent, this opinion exhibits the same
'3 Id. (Wald, J., dissenting); see also id. at 476 n.4 (Wald, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing a portion of the oral argument, in which the government conceded that its
position effectively meant that the public had to rely solely on official enforcement
mechanisms for the protection of animals).
1 See id. at 476 (Wald, J., dissenting).
139 See ALDF, 154 F.3d 426, 429 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, National Ass'n
for Biomedical Research v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, 119 S. Ct. 1454 (1999).
"40 Ecclesiastes 3:19 (King James). But see Genesis 1:26 (King James) ("God
said . . . let [man] have dominion over the fish in the sea, and over the fowl in
the air, and over the cattle, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing
that creepeth upon the earth.").
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overarching concern for animals.'' The decision is also sig-
nificant in light of the fact that the D.C. Circuit Court had
previously denied similar standing assertions."" The expan-
sive approach to the issue of standing, which had triumphed in
the District Court for the District of Columbia, had now re-
ceived the approval of the court of appeals. Although the dis-
sent found this opinion "frightening," the majority calmly
contended that their holding fell "well within [the standing]
requirements."' It is this Comment's contention that ALDF
should be regarded as the correct resolution of the issue of
standing in AWA suits.
The ALDF majority prefaced its arguments with a lengthy
explanation of Jurnove's injuries,'45 perhaps realizing that its
decision was controversial and needed to be supported by as
much evidence as possible. The court recounted each of
Jurnove's many visits to the zoo, describing in detail the condi-
tions he saw there, such as "a large male chimpanzee named
Barney in a holding area by himself... [where] ... he could
not see or hear any other primate."'46 First addressing the
question of whether Jurnove had suffered an injury in fact, the
majority asserted that Jurnove has alleged "far more than an
abstract, and uncognizable, interest in seeing the law en-
forced."47 Rather, the fact that Jurnove had suffered "by see-
ing with his own eyes the particular animals whose condition
caused him aesthetic injury,"48 meant that he had satisfied
the key requirement of injury-in-fact: a concrete injury particu-
lar to himself. The imprecise nature of an emotional injury,
which had so disturbed the ALDF II court, was, according to
this court, unimportant to an injury-in-fact analysis. Signifi-
141 See ALDF, 154 F.3d at 428.
1 See, e.g., Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir.
1994); Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
1 ALDF, 154 F.3d. at 452.
14 Id. at 431.
"' See id. at 429-30. The court explained that it would only consider Jurnove's
claim to standing because, according to Mountain States Legal Foundation v.
Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996), "if constitutional and prudential standing
can be shown for at least one plaintiff, we need not consider the standing of the
other plaintiffs to raise that claim." Id. at 1232.
14 ALDF, 154 F.3d at 429.
'47 Id. at 432.
"m Id. at 433.
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cantly, while the court admitted that any regular visitor to the
zoo could have experienced Jurnove's emotional injury, it ex-
plained that such a possibility did not make Jurnove's injury
any less "distinct and palpable."'49 Quoting Sierra Club v.
Morton, the court noted, "[t]o deny standing to persons who
are in fact injured simply because many others are also in-
jured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread
government actions could be questioned by nobody.' 15 So
clear was the legitimacy of this type of injury that the court
did not even discuss the possibility of a threat to the integrity
of the doctrine of standing. Injury to an aesthetic interest in
the observation of animals, when specifically defined and per-
sonally endured, was unquestionably sufficient for Article III
standing.
In concluding its injury-in-fact analysis, the court articu-
lated a "second principle of standing." 5' It held that to estab-
lish injury-in-fact, there need not be depletion of the species
concurrent with the harm caused to the plaintiff.'52 While
Judge Wald had previously proposed this idea in a footnote to
her panel dissent,'53 in this opinion she made certain that it
was judicially established. The court pointed out that the dimi-
nution-of-the-species standard had never been the law, nor
were there any known cases that held that the elimination of a
species was "an indispensable element of the plaintiffs' aes-
thetic injury."'" Additionally, the court observed that the
AWA was explicitly concerned with the quality of animal life,
rather than the number of animals in existence.155 Finally,
the court argued that it was not logical to "suppose that people
suffer aesthetic injury from government action that threatens
to wipe out an animal species altogether, and not from gov-
ernment action that leaves some animals in a persistent state
of suffering."'56 Thus the diminution-of-the-species standard
14 Id. at 432.
.5 Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972)).
1 ALDF, 154 F.3d at 437.
152 See id.
' See ALDF II, 130 F.3d 464, 473 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
1 ALDF, 154 F.3d at 437.
See id. (explaining that the standing cases that stressed animal population
devastation were cases that were "brought under conservation statutes whose mis-
sion is to preserve the number of animals in existence").
6 Id. at 438.
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was ruled a dispensable requirement that had no applicability
to standing claims under the AWA. In so holding, the court
removed a barrier that had successfully eliminated previous
AWA suits from judicial consideration.'57
The court continued to depart from precedent in its causa-
tion analysis. It noted that the government regulation that was
the cornerstone of the plaintiffs' suit required game farms to
establish specific plans regarding the social needs of non-hu-
man primates-plans which should be in accord with current
professional standards as well as subject to the direction of an
attending veterinarian.5 ' The Department of Agriculture's
regulations also permitted game farms to choose which veteri-
narians to hire in order to implement those plans.'59 This lat-
itude meant that game farms could shop around for veterinari-
ans who would agree to whatever inferior standards they
wished to establish.6 ° Therefore, because the Department of
Agriculture's lack of specific regulations permitted the game
farms to engage in a practice that enabled animal abuse, it
was logical to conclude they "caused" Jurnove's emotional inju-
ry. '6 Furthermore, the Department of Agriculture's own in-
spectors repeatedly visited the game farm and found after
every visit that conditions at the farm complied with Depart-
ment regulations.'62 Had the inspectors found the farm to be
in non-compliance with Department regulations, or had the
Department promulgated adequate rules in the first place,
Jurnove's aesthetic interest in seeing animals treated humane-
ly would never have been harmed.'63 The Department of Ag-
riculture had failed to meet its mandate, which failure caused
Jurnove's emotional injury.
This analysis appears straightforward, yet the court was
relying on a controversial premise. As the ALDF II majority
7 See id. at 447 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) ("Today's ruling is indeed a departure
from existing aesthetic injury jurisprudence . . . the Supreme Court cases address-
ing aesthetic injury resulting from the observation of animals are limited to cases
in which government action threatened to reduce the number of animals available
for observation and study.").
' See id. at 438 (citing 9 C.F.R. § 3.81(a) (1997)).
159 See ALDF, 154 F.3d at 439.
190 See id.
161 Id.
16 See id. at 439-40.
1 See id. at 440.
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had argued, the Department of Agriculture's regulations sim-
ply permitted the game farms to create the kinds of conditions
that injured Jurnove, rather than affimatively requiring
them.' The defendants did not actually compel the zoos to
engage in any sort of inhumane practices. Yet the court dis-
missed this argument as based on a "false premise. 65 Ac-
cording to the court, the proper test for causation was not
whether the government affirmatively caused the injury. Rath-
er, courts should compare what the defendants actually did
and what they should have done according to the statute."
Applying this test, the court noted that the defendants had
issued regulations that gave game farms the authority to de-
termine the standards for appropriate animal habitats, where-
as the AWA required the Department of Agriculture itself to
"'promulgate standards to govern the humane... care.., of
animals.'" "'67 Consequently, the defendants failed to abide by
their AWA mandate and were responsible for Jurnove's injury.
The logic of this analysis obscures the boldness of its implica-
tion. The Department of Agriculture's failure to prevent con-
duct outlawed by legislation was equivalent to forcing the
conduct to occur.
Predictably, the court was expansive with its
redressability analysis as well. The court argued that the relief
Jurnove requested, more stringent regulations, would auto-
matically alleviate his aesthetic injury upon any future visits
to zoos, because this particular zoo would either comply or
close, in which case its animals would be transferred to zoos
which did adhere to tougher regulations.'68 The court did not
require Jurnove to make a specific showing as to how the im-
plementation of more stringent regulations would alleviate his
emotional injury.'69 Nor did it demand that Jurnove demon-
strate that the Department of Agriculture would actually en-
force these new regulations should they be adopted. 7 '
See ALDF II, 130 F.3d 464, 469 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
16 ALDF, 154 F.3d at 441.
166 See id.
16 Id. (quoting AWA, § 2143(a) (1994)).
16 See id. at 443.
169 See id. at 443-44.
17 See ALDF, 154 F.3d at 443-44.
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As for the prudential zone of interests consideration, the
court confidently proclaimed that "logic, legislative history, and
the structure of the AWA, all indicate that Mr. Jurnove's inju-
ry satisfies the zone of interests test."171 First, as the very
purpose of animal exhibitions was to educate people, it fol-
lowed that it made no sense to maintain them unless the inter-
ests of their human observers were recognized. 72 Second,
Congress enacted the AWA with the intent to encourage out-
side monitoring of animal treatment. Third, the AWA did
not establish an oversight committee for animal exhibitions, as
it had for research activities. 74 Given the anticipated moni-
toring by concerned animal lovers demonstrated in the legisla-
tive history, Congress must have meant for individuals like
Jurnove to police the interests protected by the statute. 75
Consequently, Jurnove clearly fell within the zone of interests
protected by the AWA. 176 Not surprisingly, the dissent was
quick to capitalize on the controversial aspects of each of the
majority's standing decisions.
Overlooking the zone of interests argument, the dissent
contended that the majority's standing interpretations were a
significant weakening of the Article III standing require-
ments. 77 Judge Sentelle, author of the panel opinion, warned
the majority that it "should not lightly tinker with the consti-
tutional source of federal judicial power, even when [it] may
sympathize with the ideological goals of plaintiffs in a particu-
lar case."178 As a result, the dissent advocated a much nar-
rower interpretation of the standing requirements.79
The dissent argued that the diminution-of-the-species
touchstone was essential for an injury-in-fact analysis under
171 Id. at 444.
172 See id.
172 See id. at 444-45 (citing several statements by Congress indicating its intent
to have concerned animal lovers monitor the effectiveness of the AWA).
174 See id. at 445.
17 See ALDF, 154 F.3d at 445.
176 See id.
'7 See id. at 446 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
176 Id. at 446-47 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
'' See id. at 446 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (warning that a federal court that
exercises powers beyond that permitted by Article HI engages in extra-judicial
activity that threatens the separation of powers).
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the AWA."'8 The test avoided the creation of an overly flexi-
ble standing requirement that could be shaped to fit individual
and subjective aesthetic preferences.' According to the dis-
sent, if one were to follow the majority's injury-in-fact logic,
then "a sadist with an interest in seeing animals kept under
inhumane conditions is constitutionally injured when he views
animals kept under humane [ones]."'82 There would no longer
be any limits as to what could constitute an aesthetic injury.
After all, "humaneness, like beauty, is in the eye of the behold-
er ..... ," Consequently, Jurnove's claim of aesthetic injury
was too imprecise and subjective a harm upon which to base so
important a finding as an injury-in-fact.
The dissent attacked the majority's causation analysis as
the dangerous assertion that the government causes every-
thing that it does not explicitly prevent." It contended that
such a holding forces federal courts to hear lawsuits against
the government that allege nothing more than inadequate
supervision of AWA implementation, a "wide-ranging" theory
of causation inconsistent with divided government." A prop-
er causation analysis is one that requires a showing that the
government affirmatively approved the injurious conduct."
As for redressability, it would require "sheer speculation" in
order to determine what measures would adequately redress
Jurnove's injuries.'87 The nature of Jurnove's injury was too
fuzzy to find that it was likely, as opposed to merely specula-
tive, that it would be remedied by a decision in his favor."
Analysis of the various opinions in the ALDF cases reveals
that the ultimate problem in this case is a familiar one: the
role of the federal courts in enforcing statutory compliance.
The pro-standing camp believes that when a statute serves as
compelling an interest as animal welfare, the standing require-
i" See ALDF, 154 F.3d at 447 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
181 See id. at 448 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (contending that the elimination of
the diminution of the species test would create "an expanse of standing bounded
only by what a given plaintiff finds to be aesthetically pleasing").
1 Id. at 448-49 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 448 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
1 See id. at 452 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
i ALDF, 154 F.3d at 452 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
8 See id. at 453 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
18 Id. at 454 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
1 See id. (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
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ments must be interpreted broadly so as to effectuate the un-
derlying purpose of the statute. Thus, the ALDF I majority
opinion, the ALDF II dissent, and the ALDF majority decision
each emphasize the duty of the courts to make sure that the
AWA, a statute designed to prevent animal abuse, actually
does so.'89 In contrast, the anti-standing camp relies on strict
adherence to traditional standing interpretations, fearful that
any dilution will change the requirements from a shield
against non-federal claims into a sword that forces the federal
courts to become a forum for personal grievances. Thus, the
ALDF II majority, and the ALDF dissent circumscribe their
comments with outraged appeals to the continued integrity of
the federal system."9 The proper role of the judiciary creates
a tension that forms a neat circle around the case. The ALDF I
opinion began with a paean to the judiciary as the last bastion
of hope for animals and the public confidence, in the face of
vague legislation. 9' The ALDF dissent concluded with an
ominous warning that such broad judicial power would weaken
the public confidence in government and facilitate a shift away
from a democratic form of government. 9" However, at least
with regard to the AWA, it is the pro-standing camp that
should win the argument.
.9 See, e.g., ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. 44, 50-51 (D.D.C. 1996) (arguing that not
only are animals a subject of "great importance to all humankind," but also that
the failure of the Legislative and Executive branches to reflect this reality in their
animal protection statutes necessitates court intervention); see also ALDF II, 130
F.3d 464, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Wald, J., dissenting) (asserting that the strict
standing analysis required by the majority "offends the compassionate purposes of
the statute"); ALDF, 154 F.3d at 428-30 (reiterating the purposes of the AWA and
the myriad violations Jurnove encountered as a result of the Secretary of
Agriculture's inadequate implementation).
,, See ALDF II, 130 F.3d at 467 (explaining the restrictive purpose of the
standing requirements); see also ALDF, 154 F.3d at 454-55 (Sentelle, J., dissent-
ing) (analogizing the ALDF plaintiffs to federal taxpayer plaintiffs and quoting
Judge Powell's warning, "qt seems to me inescapable that allowing unrestrict-
ed ... standing would significantly alter the allocation of power at the national
level, with a shift away from a democratic form of government." (quoting United
States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
'2, See ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. at 51.
1,2 See ALDF, 154 F.3d at 454.
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B. Evaluation of ALDF
ALDF's interpretation of the standing requirements is the
correct analysis of plaintiff standing under the AWA. Its state-
ment that an acceptable AWA plaintiff is any concerned ani-
mal lover who (1) suffers emotional distress as a result of regu-
lar contact with an animal kept in conditions the plaintiff
considers inhumane, (2) demonstrates that the Department of
Agriculture neglected its AWA mandated duty to regulate the
entity providing the inhumane conditions, and (3) specifies his
requested relief as simply the general amendment of the regu-
lation in question, is a logical and reasonable interpretation of
the standing doctrine. Admittedly, the decision is uncharacter-
istically broad. It affirmed the sufficiency of personal emotional
distress for an injury-in-fact, allowed the definition of causa-
tion to be expanded to include the absence, as well as the pres-
ence, of regulation and fashioned a definition of redressability
that does not demand a specific showing as to how the harm
will be alleviated. However, this broadness does not mean that
the decision is incorrect. The AWA, long a focus of public criti-
cism for its ineffectiveness,'93 may now, as a result of this de-
cision, begin to do its job.
There are several factors that support the legitimacy of the
ALDF decision. First, it is important to note that it was not
until the 1920s that the standing doctrine emerged as a dis-
crete doctrine in its own right."9 Since that time, the courts
have repeatedly altered the definitions of its various require-
ments, very often making them more inclusive.'95 For exam-
ple, in 1973, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
SCRAP,'96 substantially broadened the injury-in-fact require-
ment.'97 The Court held that five environmentally concerned
" See, e.g. Mendelson, supra note 15, at 795 (stating that there is a general
consensus that the AWA has failed to fulfill its potential in fostering the humane
treatment of animals); see also Bridget Klauber, See No Evil, Hear No Evil: The
Federal Courts and the Silver Spring Monkeys, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 520
(1992) (stating that "[t]he AWA in its present configuration is impotent").
194 See Klauber, supra note 193, at 511.
195 See Klauber, supra note 193, at 511.
196 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
197 See id. at 683-91. Klauber notes, however, that the Supreme Court has been
trying to back down from this extreme position. See Klauber, supra note 193, at
511.
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plaintiffs had satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement by alleg-
ing nothing more than an aesthetic injury caused by the poten-
tially harmful environmental impact of a railroad surcharge
that might discourage recycling.'98 Although those plaintiffs
were not suing under the AWA,'99 the SCRAP decision sup-
ports the legitimacy of the ALDFs expansive standing inter-
pretation in AWA suits.
Second, it is possible to assert that the ALDF court's
standing interpretation is not an expansion of the doctrine of
standing per se, but simply a reflection of a standing concep-
tion that is not currently shared by a majority of jurists. It has
been noted that an interest must be "'comprehensible to the
Court, nonidiosyncratic, and sufficiently accepted by society at
large to be considered judicially cognizable . ."o Thus,
ALDFs standing interpretation can be considered as merely a
holding slightly ahead of its time, rather than a fundamental
misconception of the nature of standing itself.
Finally, there is great merit to the contention that, since
the protection of animals is of increasing national concern,20'
the courts should bolster the AWA by making good faith, legal-
ly supportable standing decisions in order to further its pur-
pose. It is true that the doctrine of separation of powers forbids
the judiciary to usurp the legislature's constitutionally delegat-
ed function to create the law. It is Congress, not the federal
courts, which is directly accountable to the American people
and should effectuate their concerns. However, for the courts
to repeatedly dismiss suits based upon a rigid and detached
standing analysis contrary to the recognized purposes of the
AWA is equally unjust. Indeed, to engage in such action is an
abrogation of the social responsibility of the courts to ensure
that the statutes the citizenry helped to create fulfill their
intended purpose. As one commentator has noted, "stand-
" See SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 683-84.
19 See id. at 670.
20 Klauber, supra note 193, at 509 (quoting Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the
Disintegration of Article III, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1915, 1934 (1986)).
201 See Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property and Legal Welfarism: 'Unneces-
sary" Suffering and the "Humane" Treatment of Animals, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 721,
721 (1994).
202 See, e.g., Klauber, supra note 193, at 520 ("To insure that our society acts
responsibly now, the courts must allow the public to scrutinize the medical re-
search community and its practices. Just because one refuses to hear the screams
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ing law not only leads to bad decisions, it represents bad soci-
ology and bad morality as well."203
It is wrong for the judiciary to use the separation of pow-
ers argument to insulate itself from legitimate AWA claims
that happen to be controversial. Such behavior threatens the
credibility of the federal courts and makes federal judges
complicit partners in illegal government behavior--which argu-
ably erodes democracy to a much greater degree than expan-
sion of the standing doctrine.
III. ALDFS IMPACT UPON ANIMAL WELFARE AND ANIMAL
RIGHTS
""he greatness of a nation and its moral progress can be judged by
the way its animals are treated.'"2"
The ALDF case evidences the moral progress mentioned
above. At the district court level, despite a previous
reversal,0 5 the ALDF I court, motivated by its concern that
the AWA be used to protect animals, persisted in holding that
the standing doctrine had been satisfied.06 The ALDF court
boldly contradicted its own precedent, over vehement dissent,
in part because of its conviction that the AWA reflected a deep
public concern for the humane treatment of captive ani-
mals."7 Significantly, on April 19, 1999, the Supreme Court
denied certification of this case.08 Although the denial was
not accompanied by explanation, the Court apparently was not
concerned that the ALDF decision threatened the demise of
Article III standing. Consequently, ALDFs standing interpre-
tation is good law, at least in the District of Columbia, and
suits brought under the AWA may now achieve tangible, posi-
tive protection for animals living in captivity.
does not mean that the suffering does not exist.").
20 Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Gover-
nance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1511 (1988).
20 Rhonda Bennon, Research Guide for Animal Welfare and Animal Rights, 4
LEGAL REFERENCES SERVICEs No. 3, at 3 (1984) (quoting Mahatma Gandhi).
2 See Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 29 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
20 See ALDF I, 943 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1996).
20 See ALDF, 154 F.3d 426, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, National Ass'n
for Biomedical Research v. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 1454
(1999).
21 See National Ass'n for Biome4ical Research v. Animal Legal Defense Fund,
Inc., 119 S. Ct. 1454 (1999).
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However, proponents of animal rights, as opposed to ani-
mal welfare, are not likely to hail the decision as a long-await-
ed advance in animal protection." 9 This is because, from an
animal rights perspective, any decision that focuses on the
question of human, rather than animal, standing in animal
abuse suits misses the point. Animal rights advocates cam-
paign for the recognition of rights inherent in animals them-
selves, which would mean that animal abuse suits could be
brought on behalf of the animal directly, rather than through
the medium of an injury done to a human being.210 The more
common animal welfare perspective, on the other hand, while
concerned about animal mistreatment, does not propose that
animals share "the moral respect and consideration" that we
consider inherently due human beings.21" ' ALDF reflects the
animal welfare perspective. The government was not sued
because the primates themselves were injured by the inhu-
mane conditions, although undoubtedly that was the plaintiffs'
main concern. Rather, the plaintiffs sued on the grounds that
they were injured by the inhumane conditions. Thus, from the
animal rights perspective, this suit was merely the perpetua-
tion of the status quo. Indeed, from the animal rights view-
point, the AWA itself is meaningless. For as a "welfare" act, by
its very definition, the AWA subscribes to the theory that hu-
man capture and use of animals is acceptable, as long as it is
done humanely. Thus, the AWA does not protect animals from
human use in all situations, but only those in which that use
harmed the animal, and even then only if a human being was
injured as a result of that animal mistreatment. Consequently,
for animal rights advocates, ALDF is an unremarkable, and
perhaps even unfortunate, decision. After all, if the courts are
2' See e.g., GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996).
21 See, e.g., Roger W. Galvin, What Rights for Animals? A Modest Proposal, 2
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 245, 246 (1985) ([T]his article asserts the position that ani-
mals need legal recognition of their inherent rights and interests. They must have
access to our courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies so they may have
their rights and interests given the same consideration as that of any other legal
entity.").
211 FRANCIONE, supra note 209, at 8.
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making it increasingly easy for human standing to be estab-
lished in animal abuse cases, the need for the recognition of
independent jural standing for animals may become less
pressing.
Nevertheless, ALDF suggests two reasons why indepen-
dent standing for animals may be an idea whose time has
come. The first reason stems from the circuit court's recogni-
tion that in order to effect the congressional intent behind the
AWA, it had to interpret the Article JII standing requirements
more broadly than it had in the past. As mentioned earlier,
this suggests that the court considered the threat of animal
mistreatment to be more important than the maintenance of
traditional standing principles. Furthermore, our own history
shows that the concept of a "right" has changed over
time-women and African-Americans today have rights, yet this
has not been the case for much of America's history. In es-
sence, society has evolved. As there is evidence that a pro-
animal sentiment is shared by a significant portion of the pub-
lic at large,2'2 it is plausible to assume that, in time, society,
and by extension the judiciary, may continue this evolutionary
process by determining that animals should be granted rights
as well.
The second reason why ALDF supports the recognition of
independent jural standing for animals is suggested by the
ALDF dissent. The dissent contended that the majority had to
engage in far-fetched arguments in order to find that Jurnove
had standing.213 While this Comment has shown that the
ALDF decision was perfectly reasonable, the dissent did make
22 See, e.g., Galvin, supra note 210, at 245 ("[For many, limiting the applicabil-
ity of the concepts of morality and legal responsibility to solely our fellow man
seems right, proper, and grounded on a solid moral foundation .... A shift in
awareness and perception has led many to the inevitable conclusion that justice
only for man is a perverse distortion of any meaningful concept of justice."); see
also FRANCIONE, supra note 191, at 721 (There is increasing social concern about
our use of nonhunans for experiments, food, clothing, and entertainment. This ...
reflects . . . our recognition that the differences between humans and animals are,
for the most part, differences of degree and not of kind.").
213 See ALDF, 154 F.3d 426, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sentelle, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, National Ass'n for Biomedical Research v. Animal Legal Defense Fund,
Inc., 119 S. Ct. 1454 (1999) ("According to the majority, causation is established if
a plaintiff demonstrates that challenged governmental action 'authorizes' the
plaintiffs injuries. But the majority uses the term 'authorize' in a very loose
way.").
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an important point. There is a danger that this broadened
standing analysis could create a "slippery slope" in which
courts, in their efforts to give effect to the AWA, find standing
to sue in situations where none should exist. For example, a
court might use this expanded standing doctrine to find a le-
gally redressable injury when primates were not kept "in cages
in which recordings of Mozart piano concertos are played
around the clock."214 Such results would erode the doctrine of
standing to the point where the federal courts would be flooded
with frivolous, and constitutionally impermissible, claims.
One solution to this legitimate concern is to grant animals
their own jural standing. Such a decision would relieve the
courts of the burden of justifying their decisions with tortured
explanations of how a human plaintiff was harmed by the
animal mistreatment. The criticism that "the search for an
actual human injury often leads to tangential inquiries into
topics such as the plaintiffs vacation preferences and feelings
about animals" would no longer be applicable.215 Although
granting standing to animals requires serious changes in our
legal system, and brings up a new set of problems as to how to
determine if an animal has been injured, independent standing
would resolve the problem of the erosion of meaningful stand-
ing requirements. If courts are to continue to be responsive to
the abuses inflicted upon animals, yet at the same time protect
an important constitutional tenet from destruction, such a
change might be warranted.
Yet independent jural standing for animals, no matter how
great the public sympathy towards animal mistreatment, is
unlikely to occur. One pamphlet characterized the controversy
over animal rights as a choice between "Rats or Babies,"216
and the characterization is relatively apt. While a protective
sentiment towards animals is an increasingly popular view-
point, for most people there is a stopping point, namely when
the rights of an animal come into conflict with the rights of a
214 Id. at 448 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
215 See Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 7, at 779.
2. This phrase is from a donation solicitation pamphlet produced by a society
called "The Nature of Wellness," based in Glendale, California (on file with Brook-
lyn Law Review). The organization is devoted to stopping animal experimentation
in the name of science. For information regarding "The Nature of Welness," see
The Nature of Wellness (visited Feb. 18, 2000) <httpi//www.animalresearch.org>.
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human being. "It is one thing to treat animals as mere resourc-
es if they are presumed to be little more than living robots, but
it is entirely different if they are recognized as fellow sentient
beings."217 Thus the human standing approach, as broadened
by ALDF, is perhaps the best method of animal protection
available in our society. "They can't make or abide by agree-
ments, can't learn to follow rules of ownership, can't do any-
thing except what their instincts prompt. They cannot be a
part of our society, period. They just don't get it."218 Consider-
ing views like this, it is difficult to posit that independent jural
standing for animals is a legitimate possibility.
Additionally, several logistical hurdles need to be overcome
in order to grant animals standing. First, our courts, as pres-
ently configured, are not appropriate fora for the resolution of
disputes between animals and humans."9 Our legal system
simply is not designed to resolve inter-species disputes. This is
because our courts, run by human beings, can approach animal
issues from only one perspective, the human one." ° Unlike
humans, animals cannot explain the nature and source of their
injuries. Thus, when animal rights activists seek judicial recog-
nition of animal injuries that have not harmed any humans,
they force courts to act as "guardians" for the animal and to
independently ascertain whether an injury was inflicted.22'
This is an impossible task that clearly exceeds the scope of a
court's duties. Our courts would become "free-ranging commis-
sions of inquiry... if the requirements of human standing
were removed and any advocate.., purporting to speak for
any animal [was] entitled judicial access to press the animal's
rights and to argue the animal's case."222 The judiciary sim-
ply is not qualified to make national animal policy.'
The second barrier to animal standing is related to the
first. Although our legal system is not equipped to handle
inter-species disputes, it does have a method of dealing with
217 FRANCIONE, supra note 209, at 722.
218 Per Malloch, Animals Should be Eaten, Vegetarians Should Be Quiet, COLUM-
BIA DAILY SPECTATOR, Oct. 13, 1998, at 4.
219 See Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 7, at 779.
22 See id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 760.
2" See id.
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animals. Animals are defined as property and are thus subject
to property law.2" This property classification essentially
means that an injury inflicted upon an animal (however sen-
tient) is no more significant than a dent inflicted upon a car.
The only factor of legal significance is that a human being was
harmed as a result. According to one commentator, the only
way to remove this property classification from animals would
be to dismiss as irrelevant "innate human characteristics, the
ability to express reason, to recognize moral principles, to
make subtle distinctions, and to intellectualize."2" While it is
not necessarily true that every human exhibits these admira-
ble qualities, it is true that no animal does. There is no escap-
ing the truth that "[tihere is property and there are per-
sons.., if animals are not property, then they must migrate
to the realm of entities with rights."22 Because animals can
never share these uniquely human traits, which create the
benefits (and burdens) of having rights, they must be classified
legally as property (although a special, sentient kind). This ne-
gates the possibility of their independent jural standing.
A third impediment to animal standing is American eco-
nomic and research needs. An extremist viewpoint introduces
it best. "If the animal rightists succeed, we will no longer be
able to produce or consume animal products. No more ham-
burgers at McDonald's... [and it would be] rough on the poor
people in Third World countries, who would have to suffer
natural disasters, poverty, or war, without being able to count
on American animal agriculture.""2 7 Additionally, animal
testing is an integral part of the American pharmaceutical
industry, as well as a means of discovering life saving cures.
"Spare the rat and kill the child" is a common refrain when
animal testing bans are proposed.2" While very few people
wish the animal kingdom to be a "spare parts supply house"
for the drug industry, there is probably very little support for
the saving of a rat's life at the expense of a dying child.
9
See Kelch, supra note 8, at 535.
Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 7, at 752.
"' Kelch, supra note 8, at 581.
MARQUARDT, supra note 1, at 66-67.
MARQUARDT, supra note 1, at 35.
z' MARQUARDT, supra note 1, at 37-38. Interestingly, the author points out that
even the diabetic director of research and investigations for People for the Ethical
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Therefore, if animals had standing to sue, every animal
slaughter, not just those of bunnies and puppy dogs, could
potentially become a legally cognizable claim. Countervailing
considerations such as economic duress or medical necessity
would carry no weight, just as they do not with human homi-
cide. It is unlikely that the American populace as a whole, no
matter how concerned it becomes with animal abuse, will
lobby Congress to implement a change with such massive and
significant repercussions.
However, while the recognition of animal rights is an un-
likely possibility, greater protection of their welfare is not.
Jeremy Bentham famously argued, "'The question is not can
they reason? nor, can they talk? but, can they suffer?"' 0 If it
is generally agreed that animals, because of their capacity for
feeling, should be treated humanely, there is no reason why
the denial of standing to animals should result in their oppres-
sion. In the case of Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hospital,
Inc.,"' a court considered the issue of the damages appropri-
ate for the maltreatment of a dog's euthanized body. 2 The
court stated "a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special
place somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal
property .... To say [a dog] is a piece of personal property and
no more is a repudiation of our humaneness.""3 In Bueckner
v. Hamel,' a concurring judge commented in dicta: "Society
has long since moved beyond the untenable Cartesian view
that animals are unfeeling automatons and, hence, mere prop-
erty. The law should reflect society's recognition that animals
are sentient and emotive beings that are capable of providing
companionship to the humans with whom they live.""5 Just
because animals are not endowed with the same rights as hu-
mans does not mean that they can be maltreated and exploited
with impunity. As ALDF demonstrated, our legal system is
Treatment of Animals ("PETA"), an animal rights (as opposed to welfare) group,
uses synthetically manufactured insulin that contains some animal products. See
MARQUARDT, supra note 1, at 37-38.
Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 7, at 750 (citation omitted).
" 97 Misc. 2d 530, 415 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1979).
See id. at 530-31, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 182-83.
'3 Id. at 531, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 183.
886 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App. 1994).
Id. at 377-78 (Andell, J., concurring).
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adapting to society's evolving recognition of the importance of
animal welfare. There is no reason not to develop and legally
enforce this refinement of our collective animal consciousness.
CONCLUSION
It has been argued that, with regard to animal abuse, the
doctrine of standing as it is currently interpreted "forces both
litigants and courts to address situations involving animals
from a human perspective, the only perspective from which
any of us are truly qualified to analyze an issue." 6 Without
challenging that position, the ALDF decision has, through its
expansive interpretation of the doctrine of standing, made
suits under the AWA an effective means of achieving protec-
tion for the animals that come under its auspices. However,
while the decision is a triumph for all who care about animal
welfare, it does not foreclose the possibility of congressional
and judicial recognition of rights inherent to animals. Rather,
ALDF may serve as a catalyst for increased pressure on gov-
ernment to allow animals to have their own independent jural
standing, for two reasons: first, because the court's broad inter-
pretation of standing demonstrates judicial and societal recog-
nition of the increasing necessity for animal protection, and
second, because of the valid concern that a continued broaden-
ing of our standing requirements may lead to the erosion of
any meaningful standing requirement for AWA suits. However,
the recognition that animals have co-equal rights with human
beings is unlikely to occur because of the structure of our legal
system and the needs of our populace. Consequently, in order
to extend as much protection as possible to animals, ALDFs
interpretation of AWA standing should be adopted as the stan-
dard in all courts. Now that the Supreme Court has denied
certiorari for ALDF, this seems possible.
Fiona M. St. John-Parsons
' Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 7, at 779.
1999]

